Month 8 Day 9

Notebook Entry
Nine reports given, the constraint is our time with the Afghan National Army, What is the adjacent possible? Nawa Transition pushed, focus on stuff, staff pressure, 15 year perspective now, Garrison Support Unit intelligence goes to class Garrison Support Unit Admin has 12 leave blocks, Asadullah late, Garrison Support Unit logisitics decree, Homework not done, Admin resistant to new leave policy.

Journal Entry
A lot of interesting things to write about.

I just finished The Goal. It is a book about manufacturing, and in it they basically describe any sequential process as limited by the throughput of the slowest thing in that process. They were talking about how oftentimes this principle and the subsequent logical steps have been applied outside of manufacturing with great success. I started the think about it and our constraint here is our time with the Afghans. I brought that up with LtCol Paul Shinkman yesterday, but he said-“well the meeting schedule for the RCT is pretty tight”

I started listening to another book. Where Good Ideas Come from. It gave me a good framework to think about Afghanistan, about the USMC, and about the book. It talked about the near simultaneous invention of lots of inventions, the telephone, telegraph, etc. These were ideas whose time was ripe. Then it talked about the first ‘analytical engine’ really the first computer designed in the 1850s. It had a type of RAM, Hard Drive, Processor. All the hallmarks of the computer, but it was literally ‘ahead of its time’ the inventor labored on it for basically his whole life and nothing happened with it. All the the components had to be separately reinvented over 100 years later. The reason this seems important is because in addition to acting with effect in mind (something that I do not do well, I tend to act with what I think is right, damn the effect), I need to think about what can possibly be done. They call this the ‘adjacent possible.’ Can I genuinely convince the American public or the USMC that the way we are going about this is wrong or make a big-enough change that it justifies the sacrifice? Can I legitimately effect what goes on in Col Schmitt’ campaign plan, or am I going to be stuck playing at the margins? There is no use laboring on something that is ahead of its time and is going to be shut down, but it does make sense to try to push people to the adjacent possible.

Had another ANSF working group. The focus was on MoD-14s-these are the forms that get you stuff. The advisors said that no matter how many MoD-14s we submit we are not going to get more radios because they are all going to new units. They said we need to get Nawa ready to transition to Afghan control. They asserted that there was not enough stuff there for them to work with. I spoke up and said that I had been to Nawa, done patrols with the Tolais [Companies approx 100 soldiers] there and that they had plenty of stuff, they were also probably going to abandon it in favor of cell phones as soon as the Marines leave. The problem is not stuff, the problem is training. That is the really hard part, I have spent two weeks trying to teach my guy how to fill out one form. “Downs syndrome Chuck” as the S6 [Communications] officer is called said he could get a mobile training team, but I explained that they are too illiterate and ADD to get it . I was ignored. I also brought up that there is really only about 1 thing that we can focus on at a time with the staff because the General is the only one they are going to listen to and he only has a limited set of things he can beat them up about at a time. The Advisors talked to LtCol Paul Shinkman afterword about the focus on stuff vs process, he said that the [Regimental Combat Team Commanding Officer] “is not a patient man and these guys are being berated every day about this, so they need to push for what the Colonel wants or he will fire them and send them home.” Awesome command climate.

At lunch over homemade Pizza at DFAC 5 I brought up with Capts Arthur and Brawny. “Who cares if you get fired, you are here to serve the country, not a guy, grab your balls and say what actually needs to get done. What about God Country and then Corps, we are supposed to be officers” Capt Brawny chimed in “your perspective changes after about 15 years in the military, you have your plan.” I bet it does. “we are supposed to be military officers, we are supposed to have branch and sequel plans” I guess that didn’t occur to anyone. Who cares if you are fired, ITS NOT ABOUT YOU.

The afternoon with the Afghans was pretty good. The GSU S2 [Garrison Support Unit Intelligence] went to the class, the GSU S1 [administration] already had 12 leave blocks set out for the new leave policy. Asadullah, one of my new S2 sgts drew a better motorcycle in powerpoint than I could have. Qais gave me a brief overview of some of the things he learned. I told him to be ready to give a class on it tomorrow. The Bde [Brigade] S1 was resistant to the new leave policy. He said the soldiers are only in the Army for 4 years, don’t you think they should have a different policy than the officers who have been in the Army for 30 years? He also pushed for a plan that looked basically like the one that was just implemented. He said he would tell the General as much and try to get to the kandaks to figure out why the soldiers are going on leave-all right nice work. I told him he was right in both regards but that the policy was being pushed by Col Schmitt, so it was probably going to happen. If and when it happens, we need to salute sharply and do what we are told, but we should start planning.

Interesting day.

Month 6 Day 28

Notebook Entry
62 reports to Rafi, Combat Operation Center morning-working, MoD-14, Afternoon Video teleconference, Division of Labor, Weather with Salim

Journal Entry
Had a confrontation with Rafi in the combined CoC [Combat Operations Center]. I didn’t yell at him, but his issues came to a head. He didn’t want to do anything else because he said he knows he is leaving. I told him that when I see the paperwork, then I will stop training him. Until then I will continue to work with him at 1500 every day if he is at Camp Garmsir and at a time of my choosing if he is in the combined CoC. If he didn’t show up or doesn’t want to work, then I will not give him any reports or weather. I will also write in my weekly report to the General that he willfully did not attend or pay attention in class. Maj Hesco came in the midst of our conversation, and as he normally does, he wants to get involved and put his own swing on things, so he started talking to Rafi instead of me. At first this annoyed me, then it was good. Maj Hesco poignantly asked him “do you want the Lt [referring to me] to say that you are doing well, that you are learning and coming to class when you are not? Do you want him to lie?” Rafi said “yes”, then thought about it and corrected himself and said no. Sigh. In the afternoon we had a VTC in the S3 conference room. It was basically a glorified radio traffic session. It was not a real conference. The kandaks are saying, we got this many detainees, this many PKMs, etc. Maj Kraus wants them to keep coming to the table and maybe make it more fruitful than it is. I came back and worked with Salim on the weather. He is getting better at typing, reading and putting things in the right boxes, but the analysis is still not there. When give the following information

Windspeed: 6 MPH
Direction:N-S
High temp: 72
Low Temp: 50
Windchill: 0
Sunrise/Set: 0500/1800
Moonrise/Set: 1100/0100
Moon illumination: 15%
General Weather: Thunderstorms and rain

When asked what is the most important thing to friendly and enemy ops he selected lunar illum and wind direction…really…really you can’t even see the moon because of the giant fucking thunderstorm. It took me 45 Min to explain why those had no effect on our operations.

I nearly got backed into by Jamal who did get backed into by one of the Afghan soldiers. He just decided he wanted to go backward, no rearview mirrors, or turning around necessary. Fucktard.

Month 6 Day 13

Notebook Entry
No reports, Combined Combat Operations Center in the morning, Rafi put on database pull weather from the internet, afternoon Salim late class on map with Regimental Combat Team, communications course graduates.

Journal entry
Went to the combined CoC in the morning. I showed Rafi how to pull the weather off the newly unblocked website on the ANA computer. I also go him set up to start using the new database program. Came back and worked on the tip to Nawa, setting up the new tents, etc. I also inadvertently got into a pissing match with the Ops Chief, MSgt Mirwais Khan. He is about to take over from MGySgt Andy Kravetz, a dinosaur who doesn’t seem to realized that our Afghans are the exit strategy, not a ‘nice to have.’ MSgt K actually came into the CoC [Combat Operations Center] in the morning was asking a few questions and I was giving him the best explanations that I had. He seemed to have some of the same concerns that we had, e.g. giving them capabilities that they will not have in the long term. It is a bit annoying that he just now came in, but whatever. I asked to have a couple of websites unblocked by comm, google translation services, and Google Earth or Google maps.

Here is the E-mail string:

Sir,

Please vet this request through the RCT OPS [operations] section.

r/s

GySgt Stephanie Gaskell,.
Information Assurance Officer
Regimental Combat Team
Dwyer, Afghanistan

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane 1stLt Scott (RCT S-2 MENTOR)
Sent: Sunday [Redacted for date]
To: Gaskell GySgt Stephanie (RCT S-6 IAO)
Subject: two more websites

GySgt,
Could you please unblock the following things on the ANA computers:
Google Earth, or at least google maps, they have no mapping software and this will help
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl
Google Language tools
http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=en

R,
Lt S

1stLt Shane, Scott
Regimental Combat Team Embedded Training Team S-2 Mentor


After his reply, I wrote back the one word response, “Why.” That pissed off the CoC, God-forbid that anything not run through them (it is really not their job, to be honest). Anyways, they said no, until I called MSgt K and talked him down. It was a perfect example of the ‘success through bureaucratic deflection’ that comm [the Communications Section] is so good at. GySgt Stephanie Gaskell, whose job it is to make these decisions/changes, wants you to run through extra layers of bureaucracy to make her job easier. If this were really the policy, then how come we didn’t follow this the last 4 times. It is just gay, and an intense waste of time. We need to get a few of these extra bodies out of this country.

Salim showed up late to class and was not able to tell me what his job was for the day on the new schedule that they just created. Rafi had just created it, and that was it. Qais had no idea where he was supposed to be either. I’m like, ‘fuck guys, you complain that you don’t have responsibilities and that you get your asses chewed when stuff doesn’t get done, then we come up with a solution, and you don’t follow it.’ It is really aggravating that I care about their lives and their jobs more than they do. They are just plain lazy. After chewing their asses for a little while for being late the guy from the Sgt from the RCT showed up to give them a class.

I went and spoke with the General and gave him the weekly report. He was pissed that he hadn’t received it from the XO before. I told him Samir had left on leave instead of going to the class. The general bitched about being stressed out and bitched about his XO. He seemed to be supportive of chewing the S2s ass if they didn’t show up for classes.

Joy

Month 5 Day 30

Notebook Entry
11 Reports, watch morning, class with Samir afternoon Rafi to Videoteleconference.

Journal Entry
Did watch at the CCoC [Combined Combat Operations Center Watch] this morning. I discovered how little the RCT [Marine Regimental Combat Team] CoC want to play ball. I asked them to provide one marine to watch the CCoC for 20 minutes because we only had one Marine and wanted to keep the Afghans up on communication. The MGySgt [Master Gunnery Sergeant] said, ‘sir, not during the day, I can’t do that.’ I’m like really, some people take that long to take a crap in the morning, you mean to tell me that the 20 or so guys that you have in there are all so pivotal that they can’t stand in the doorway next to their desk, rather than sit at their desk for 20 minutes. It just shows what a farce the whole thing is and how important it is for commanders to quit[sp] commanding and start getting buy-in.

Came back and did some work, I was supposed to do a Video teleconference in the afternoon but I let myself get sucked into some supply stuff because I knew it was going to be absolutely useless, from what I hear, it was. I taught a class on mapping to Sgt Salim and did a little more work.

Some of the Afghan Soldiers Unloading a plywood shipment.

Month 5 Day 23

Notebook Entry
First Day new Combat Operations Center, Major Kraus says we are better, talked about job description, plotted Battalions, spoke with Executive Officer he said Samir would go to class.

Journal Entry
I took the Afghans to the CoC [Combat Operations Center] for their second day. They are not happy about this new CoC at the RCT [Marine Regimental Combat Team]. There is a complete lack of empathy towards them at the RCT. I went to talk to Maj Kraus. I told him 3 days ago that he would need to speak to the General before he started handing out ID cards to the ANA [Afghan National Army], and two days ago he started handing them out without a word to the general. I told him that you need to treat these guys like equals not like subordinates or they will not respond well. He say ‘well lets face it, they are not equals.’ That basically sums up the feelings of the RCT to the ANA, I think. They are not equals, so they will just try to order them around. They are going to be sorely disappointed when they recoil and refuse to do what the RCT wants them to do. Oh well. I worked with Samir in the afternoon on developing a job description for his NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers], I also gave the next NCO a literacy test. He too failed miserably with a 58%. My favorite answer was you go to school to a. sleep b. cry c. fight d. learn. Naturally he chose sleep. I spoke with the XO [Executive Officer] after working with Samir and his crew. The XO chewed out Samir in the morning and Samir didn’t even want to talk to him. The XO conveyed legitimate concerns. He told me. Hey you have worked with him for 5 months and what can you say he has really learned. That question gave me pause. I must admit. I don’t know that I have taught him anything useful in 5 months. The XO said accurately that he does not want to learn. I agree, but he is the only thing I’ve got. I can’t train guys who I want, but are not here. The XO did ultimately say that he could go to the intel course in Kabul. I have heard good things about it from the Corps mentor. He says he went there during their finex [Final Exercise] and they were all working on MCOOs [a type of military map], briefing what they learned, it was great information. At the very least, he will get some training while I am on leave.

Month 5 Day 22

Notebook Entry
33 reports to the ANA [Afghan National Army], Class with Samir on Maps was good literacy test to Sergeant 48%.

Journal Entry
Went to the RCT [Regimental Combat Team] staff meeting in the morning because Maj Hesco was busy managing the leave flight. Col Schmitt is really a large part of the problem with advising. He said ‘I can go find the guys on Camp Garmsir to take up security duty X’ really, sir? There are 200 guys here. Only 40% are reporting for duty from the Bde [Brigade] and 35% from the GSU [Garrison Support Unit] (I told him those number, he clearly hadn’t heard them before). Where are you finding the guys. They don’t even man their own towers anymore because they are so Taxed by BDOC [Base Defense Operations Center] with manning the guard posts around base. He also said that the ANA [Afghan National Army] need to abandon their COC [Combat Operations Center] and move over to the new one the RCT made. I told him it would be a hard sell. I mean just put yourself in their shoes for a second, what would you feel like if the general I want to partner with you so why don’t you move your COC up here to Camp Garmsir. He is making decisions not supported by the facts, but supported by what he wants to happen or what he wants the facts to be.

Maj Kraus wanted me to bring Samir to him and provide him with a terp so he could teach him a class on what he wanted to teach him. I am like, man if you want to partner why don’t you drive down here, get a HQ co terp, and do your thing. I am not going to do all of the legwork for you.

I came back and worked with Samir for about 1 hour on the map. That went ok. I thought maybe he was coming around and then he changed his tune and asked to go to Kabul for the course. I wonder if he is trying to slip out on leave? I met with one of the new Sgts in the afternoon (Samir couldn’t find the other one). I gave him the literacy test, he scored 48%, if he were just straight guessing he would have gotten a 25%. So I told Samir, when I tell you we need to test the NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers] before all of the other NCOs get sent to the kandaks you need to do what I say because this was exactly what I was afraid of. We have a functionally illiterate S2 Sgt. [Intelligence Sergeant] Great.

Month 5 Day 16

Notebook Entry
Eleven Reports to Samir. Tried to install Talonview. Talked about course, weather, gave Operational Terms and Graphics to Samir and 2nd kandak tried to work out schooling.

Journal Entry
I worked with Samir a bit in the morning we tried to install some mapping software, but he doesn’t have the administrator rights to his computer. We talked about the courses up in Kabul for intel, but he believes that most if not all of the seats are going to be allocated to the 3 capital defense corps. Karzai’s highly-trained and unused personal army. I gave Samir and the Sgt from 2nd Kandak the ops terms and graphics pubs. Samir claimed to be sick and unable to work, but he looked fine and had no issue playing his bootleg version of tekken.

In the meeting last night I really felt for Capt Nowak. He had to deal with the OpsO [Operations Officer] LtCol Walcott all day. LtCol Walcott couldn’t understand why the ANA [Afghan National Army] would like to have their own Combat Operations Center [COC], next to their own offices on their own camp. The RCT [Regimental Combat Team] had this bright idea to move their COC to the RCT and have them commute to work so that they could be more combined. The ETT [Embedded Training Team] already stands duty in the ANA CoC, so we are already combined, but I guess that is not enough. The is a perfect example of not empathizing with the ANA. The RCT says that the ANA are partners but they treat them like subordinates. No one asked the ANA before this started if this is something that they would like to do, if it would help them, etc. They just said, yah we’ll move the ANA here, and now they are trying to make it happen and realizing that maybe the Afghans want to be able to command their own units. The real issue is that Col Schmitt opened his mouth and said that he was going to do it before he had even met the Afghans and now the stupid policy is coming to fruition. None of the staff officers have the balls to tell him that this is a stupid idea, that it is going to set back the training with the ANA and that you are making the job of a bunch of nearly illiterate, untrained guys from the third poorest country in the world even harder than it already is. If the RCT wants to be more combined, why doesn’t the RCT move its CoC down here? That thought never crossed the minds of the Marines over there. We are supposed to be the ones who are expeditionary, the ANA never claimed that. Anyway, the practical realities also reveal how little the RCT even knows about what the Afghans do. They say they can’t have cell phones there. They say they want them to have radios, but they don’t have 220 power. They say they want representation from 0800 to 2000, the Afghans basically work from 0900 to 1100 and from 1400-1600. They have no place to do their mid-day naps, no chow hall, no Turkish Toilets, no ablution stations. They say they want every staff section represented. We only have 35% of the whole Brigade here, even if they were at tashkil this would be hard, when we are looking at 1 or two guys from each section is going to be impossible, especially when they have work and meetings to do here. They say we have computers and TV for them. They all have computers and TVs in their rooms, where they can lay on their mats on the floor and relax.

The leadership of the RCT is ill-informed and has no desire to listen. Col Schmitt has cowed all of his staff officers into just acting, and doesn’t listen to their advice, not that they have any advice given that they are not here.

Month 5 Day 13

Notebook Entry
13 reports to the Afghan National Army, Combined Staff Meeting, Executive Officers weekly meeting, Samir weather afternoon.

Journal Entry
Joint staff meeting in the morning. Gave Samir the weather in the afternoon. I had to work on the antiterrorism force protection classes and the SERE classes again because I couldn’t find the certificates. Those are a couple of hours I will never get back. Nothing else really earth-shattering happened. Major Hesco was confused about the two ‘Lts’ being assigned to my section. He thought that he heard Lts so that must be the word, or so he thinks, but in fact they are sgts, but because he didn’t hear that it can’t be true. He would make one shitty intel officer. Oh well, I should stop complaining I guess.

This is what happens when some people don't have enough to do in combat.  They start to turn it into a garrison environment, in this case, there was an air-wing unit right next to us which did next to nothing and took it upon themselves to become the parking police.  Really?  If this is what you have to work on, then go home.

Month 5 Day 12

Notebook entry
Seven reports to the Afghan National Army. Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration with map grid, land navigation, Samir refused to work in the morning because Major Hesco yelled at him, Finished instructor class, eleven graduates.

Journal Entry
Major Hesco yelled at Samir in the Afghan staff meeting. I guess Samir leaned back in his chair in a way that 0-60 didn’t like and he started yelling at him. Predictably, Samir was dishonored and embarrassed, so he didn’t want to work. He also didn’t want to work with me, because he said all Marines are in the same organization and are all the same. This is a bit childish of him, but I think he is trying to get me to bring Maj Hesco to speak to him. I tried, but Maj Hesco was too proud of himself. He had yelled at a shitty Afghan officer, and when I suggested that he should apologize, or at least tell him that he is a valuable member of the team, he laughed at me. I am flabbergasted. Just because you outrank all of the Marines here, and have the right to say anything, it doesn’t mean that anything you say is right. He just spoiled at least a whole day of training. I was trying to get new personnel, equipment, and generally work with the guy. Yah, he’s a piece of crap, yah he’s lazy, yah I’d like to punch his stupid face in most of the time too, but that wouldn’t actually help me train the guy. What makes you feel good is not the point. I have yelled at Afghan’s before, but I learned my lesson, one of them was a carpenter who was cutting wood in the [Afghan] CoC [Combat Operations Center], and I told him to go outside, when he didn’t I yelled at him over the din, then grabbed the desk and took it outside. The guy did nothing, just sat and stared at me the whole day. That was a private, how much worse for their officers in front of his peers. I thought Maj Hesco would have learned his anger-management lesson when he broke a chair, screamed at the S-1 [admin officer] and had to apologize because Maj Valquist forced him to. There is a reason that Maj Valquist said that no one should yell at the ANA without his approval, but I guess there is a ‘new dog in town’ since Maj Valquist left and he feels like he can do anything.

Two other things while I am thinking about it. 1 I had to talk to the BDOC [Base Defense Operations] guys and tell them to tell their gate guards not to call our Afghan school headmaster (the one in charge of the literacy training) a mother fucker. He can speak a little English and was pissed off. I told my peer at BDOC, he wanted to know if “his feeling are hurt” in a condescending way. I reminded him that some of these guys don’t become terrorists for no reason…let’s hear it for the true character of a man is shown by how you treat those who have nothing to offer you…2. The Gunny Defended the Major’s outburst, but he hasn’t spoke his his guy in basically two months, he outright says that he can’t train him, and the Majors basically accept that. The Senior Enlisted thing deference is a bit retarded.

Oh and Jamal, the head contractor, gave the General all the hometowns and families of all of his contractors. Awesome…what is he going to do with that, run a background check? Fucking idiot, you just opened these illiterate guys up to extortion.

Month 5 Day 10

Notebook Entry
Thirteen reports to the Afghan National Army, morning weather, afternoon list of stuff from officer rearrange morn met with Ops. Clean 120 viruses off Samir’s computer, Operations Shura starts.

Journal Entry
Spoke to all of the OpsOs in the morning about intel, their role in Intel, and their reports. I was proud of Samir, he spoke to them very well. I cleaned 125 viruses off of his computer in the afternoon. We’ll see how many he gets back, and how quickly. We also rearranged his office and put up a new maps. We also came up with a wishlist of stuff that he wanted and we started to sit down and find the numbers for the items. They have several printers available in the Afghan supply system at a cost of $120,000. Thank you America. Do you know what these guys are going to do to your stuff?

Sat watch in the morning. Got yelled at by Capt Nowak for saying that I had work to do and that I didn’t have time to sit watch any more when I already sit 8 hours more watch than anyone else. He later apologized. I think he was just a little on edge. A push happened with [a fellow Marine]'s company in the morning. Nothing happened, no sigacts [Significant Activity], nothing, but I still wished that I had a platoon for a little while. Oh well. Spoke with the General about getting additional personnel for intel. He basically told us that when the new batch of NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officer's] arrived we would get some, as far as new officers, he said my guys would be returning soon after his 120 days of leave, and that he had spoken to Corps about a counterintel officer. Basically we got the brush-off. It is frustrating because unless we get the personnel we need there is not much that we can do. Intel is a people business. Again, though it loses out to the tangible functions, like logistics. Because we provide information, not stuff, the contribution cannot be defined. You will get as much out of your sections as you are willing to put in, you pompous little ‘General.’ Maybe you should give up your aid, who can read, write, and is a hard worker, maybe then we can get something done. Oh well. I’ll press on. I got Audible downloaded on my computer finally, so now I don’t have to ask Suzan for audio books. I also got Farsi installed on all of the computers. That will make life easier.

Panoramic view of one side of the office

Panoramic view of the other side.  Not much to look at, but much larger than what we had, as it should be.

Month 5 Day 7

Notebook Entry
Thirteen reports to the Afghan National Army, weather, got one report, camouflage thrown away.

Journal Entry
Spoke with Samir in the morning about the weather, gave him some reports and talked ot him about uniforms being thrown away. Went to the hospital and passed out a couple of coloring books and some more balloons for the kids there. I brought along Capt Brawny and a terp from Marjeh who had been shot. They were pretty useless, Capt Brawny has a couple of little boys, but couldn’t seem to get down and play with the kids, he just kind of passed stuff out to them and didn’t realize that they didn’t give a shit what you give to them, they just want some human contact from someone who is not changing their dressings/making them go to the toilet, or something like that. Tried to go to MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation tent], but it was shut because of river City [i.e. a Marine was killed]. Maj Rod Nordland, the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] development guy asked me if I could recommend any officers for legacy. Clearly, he has not been reading anything that I have been putting out because if he were, then he would know that I am at like 15% manning and I am having enough trouble finding literate officers for the regular S2 [intelligence] billets. If they want literate, good guys why don’t they draw from President Karzais Capital defense/personal defense corps, they are well staffed with competent officers in true nepotistic fashion. Came back and watched Gran Turino. Maj Hesco asked me whether it was proper to refer the the Afghans as Afghans or Afghanis, I told him the former and didn’t think much of it until I came into the CoC and there was a sign that says “What have you done for your Afghan today?” posted on the HVAC unit—I don’t know, sir, I have seen mine, spoken to him and we have exchanged reports. I don’t think you have even seen your guy now have you? As Capt Nowak says, if you are going to talk about it, then be about it…Ah well. The meeting was a little painful. We got onto the subject of this Combined Combat Operations [CoC] center. Capt Brawny and Capt Nowak brought up the important point that it is a terrible idea (we basically have to move the Afghans over to the [Marine Regimental] headquarters every day and this long-distance CoC is supposed to be their primary CoC. The Afghans don’t want to do it, but Col Schmitt wants to be able to tell his Bn Commanders that he has one and that they should get one too. Capt Brawny brought up the point that they never asked us about it, but that doesn’t matter, that is what the Colonel wants, and none of the Majors/LtCols have the balls to tell him it is a bad idea, so that is what he will get. I would tell him, but he wouldn’t give a shit if it came from a Lt who clearly doesn’t know what he is talking about. The cherry on top is that Col Schmitt puts out his guidance about how we should all be partnered with the ANA and this is his number 1 priority, well if it is why have you only been here like 3 times since the deployment started outside of the 3 combined staff meetings. If you are going to talk about it, then be about it, you don’t even know your counterpart’s name Brigadier General Mohammad Ali (Shujai).

Reverse Cell-phone tower.  The Afghans stood on the tallest thing around (the armory) to try to get reception.

Motivation from a man who had barely seen 'his Afghan'